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A HEAD FOR BUSINESS REGULATION – THE CORPORATIONS 




On 2 December 2005, after months of discussions about proposed changes to 
the industrial relations regime in Australia, the Senate finally agreed to an 
amended version of the changes.  Even before the legislation had been passed, 
several State Premiers had foreshadowed their intention to challenge the 
legislation on constitutional grounds.  It is not surprising, since the Australian 
Labor Party is in government in each Australian State and Territory, and many 
would argue that industrial relations policy is the fundamental policy difference 
between the Coalition parties and the Australian Labor Party, the other party 
likely to be in a position to form a government in Australia for the foreseeable 
future. 
 
This article considers whether the legislation as enacted is likely to withstand 
constitutional scrutiny by the High Court when the challenge is eventually 
heard. 
 
Outline of Legislation 
It is first necessary to outline the main features of the legislation in order to 
assess whether the Act is likely to be valid constitutionally.  Of course, when 
legislation almost 700 pages in length is being considered, it is not possible to 
consider each individual section.  Accordingly, the article focuses on major 
changes. 
 
The legislation, actually an amendment to the existing Workplace Relations Act 
1996 (Cth), is the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 
(Cth).  The changes are said to be designed to encourage high employment, 
improved living standards, low inflation and international competitiveness 
through higher productivity and a more flexible labour market.  The changes 
will lead to a simplified national system of workplace relations, while providing 
a safety net for workers.  At the heart of the changes is the encouragement given 
to individual employer and employee bargaining, and the further 
decentralisation of employee relations decision-making.1
                                                 
*Dr Anthony Gray, Head of Department, Law, Faculty of Business, University of Southern 
Queensland.   
1 Section 3 of the Act sets out the main objects.  They include also ensuring compliance with 
minimum standards, industrial instruments and bargaining processes by providing effective 
means for the investigation and enforcement of employee entitlements, and the rights and 
obligations of employers, employees and their organisations, ensuring awards provide minimum 
safety net entitlements for award-reliant employees consistent with Australian Fair Pay 
Commission decisions and which avoid creating disincentives to bargain at the workplace level, 
 
The Act contains important definitions of employer and employee.  An 
employee is someone employed by an ‘employer’ as defined in s4AB.  This 
definition, crucial to the question of the constitutionality of the provisions, will 
be considered in more detail later, but clearly relies largely on the corporations 
power.2  An employer includes a business entity that is a constitutional 
corporation.  This will cover the vast majority of workers, since according to the 
Federal Government’s estimates in 2000, corporations employ at least 85% of 
non-farm labour in Australia.3
 
It is evident that the intention is to override most of the existing State industrial 
relations jurisdiction.  This is evidenced in section 7C of the amending Act 
which states that the law excludes State or Territory industrial law, State laws 
regarding employment generally, State laws dealing with all leave (excluding 
long service leave), State laws providing for a court or tribunal to deal with 
remuneration, State laws providing for the variation of an employment 
agreement on the grounds of fairness, and State laws governing rights of entry 
to the workplace to unions (excluding entry on the ground of occupational 
health and safety).  In effect, State laws dealing with any of the above matters 
will no longer apply. 
 
However, State laws relating to other work-related matters, including 
discrimination, superannuation, workers’ compensation, occupational health and 
safety, child labour laws, long service leave, public holiday (observance, not 
pay rates), method and frequency of payment of wages or salaries, deductions 
from wages and salaries, apprenticeship matters (not pay rates), industrial 
action, jury service, and union provisions, can continue to apply.  Notably, state 
laws (including state awards) will no longer be able to include provisions about 
pay rates.  Generally, an award of workplace agreement prevails over a valid 
State law in the event of inconsistency.4
 
The Act establishes the Australian Fair Pay Commission (AFPC), which will 
take over many of the previous functions of the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission.  In particular, the AFPC is responsible for the setting of minimum 
wage levels in Australia.5  
 
The legislation provides some safety net of wage entitlements through the 
Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standard (AFPCS).  These are guaranteed 
                                                                                                                                  
supporting harmonious and productive workplace relations, balancing the right to take industrial 
action for the purposes of collective bargaining at the workplace level with the need to protect 
the public interest, ensuring freedom of association, protecting the competitive position of 
young people in the labour market, assisting employees to balance their work and family 
responsibilities, preventing and eliminating discrimination in the workplace, and assisting in 
giving effect to Australia’s international obligations regarding labour standards. 
2 S51(20) of the Constitution 
3 Breaking the Gridlock: Towards a Simpler National Workplace Relations System – Discussion 
Paper 1: The Case for Change (then Minister for Employment, Workplace Relations and Small 
Business Peter Reith)(2000) 
4 S7D, subject to exceptions dealing with occupational health and safety, workers’ 
compensation, apprenticeships, or other prescribed matters 
5 S7I 
minimum entitlements, and any workplace agreement that provides for lesser 
entitlements for employees will be invalid.6  The AFPCS applies to five 
conditions of employment: 
 
(a) basic rates of pay and casual loadings7 
(b) maximum ordinary hours of work8 
(c) annual leave9 
(d) personal leave10 
(e) parental leave11 
 
The Act encourages the making of an individual employment agreement 
between an employer and employee, called an Australian Workplace Agreement 
(AWA).12  Collective agreements may be made between employees collectively 
(with or without union involvement) and an employer.13.  The Act provides for 
an expedited ‘approval process’ for an AWA – an agreement must be signed 
and dated by both parties, and the signatures must be witnessed.14  The 
agreement is then lodged with the Employment Advocate but, unlike the 
previous system, there is no vetting of agreements.  In the past, an AWA has 
had to be approved by the Employment Advocate, who would make sure the 
agreement passed the ‘No Disadvantage’ test.  In other words, in the past the 
Employment Advocate would check to make sure that the agreement did not, on 
balance, make the worker worse off than the worker would have been under the 
relevant award.  The No Disadvantage test does not appear in the new regime, 
and the Employment Advocate will no longer be able to reject an agreement that 
in his or her opinion in fact makes the worker worse off, on balance, than the 
award entitlement.  Mandatory15 and prohibited16 content of an AWA is 
prescribed.  Collective agreements, made between an employer and groups of 
employees (with or without union representation), remain available. 
 
The amendments make it a serious offence, punishable by a maximum of 60 
penalty units, to engage in or organise, or threaten to engage in or organise, any 
industrial action, take or threaten to take other action, or refrain or threaten to 
refrain from taking any action, intending to coerce another person to agree, or 
not to agree, to make, approve, lodge, vary or terminate a collective agreement.  
Similar provisions apply to AWAs.17
 
                                                 
6 S89A(2) 
7 Called the Australian Pay and Classification Scales (APCs) 
8 Stated as 38, plus ‘reasonable additional hours’.  The average number of weekly hours can be 
averaged over a 12 month period (s91C(3)) 
9 Generally four weeks, with an ability for the employee to ‘cash out’ up to half of this (s92E) 
10 S93E 
11 S89(2) 
12 S96.  Employees must be given appropriate information about the agreement before being 
asked to sign it (s98 
13 S96A, s96B 
14 A parent or guardian will be involved if the employee is under 18 (s98C). 
15 S101, s101A-C 
16 S101D-F 
17 S104 
The amendments recognise some existing rules regarding industrial action, but 
also make some changes.  Industrial action is defined broadly in s106A to 
include refusal to attend for work, refusal to work, bans or limits on work, or 
performing work in a manner different from how that work is usually 
conducted, with the effect of delaying performance of the work.  It includes an 
employer locking employees out.18  Industrial action may either be ‘protected’ 
action or ‘unprotected’ action.  It is beneficial that industrial action be protected 
because during this time, no action may be brought against those involved in 
such action (apart from personal injury, or theft or destruction of property),19 
and an employer cannot dismiss an employee for engaging in protected action.20
 
In order to make action ‘protected’, it must occur during a bargaining period.  
The bargaining period is initiated by one party giving the other written notice to 
the other, and to the Commission, stating their wish to try to make a collective 
agreement with the other party.  The bargaining period commences seven days 
after such notice is given.21  It must be after the expiry of the existing 
agreement.  The bargaining period ends once an agreement has been reached, 
when one party tells the other they no longer wish to make a collective 
agreement, or if the period is terminated.22  The Commission can terminate a 
bargaining period on various grounds, including that it is satisfied either party is 
not genuinely trying to reach an agreement, that the industrial action is 
endangering life, that the action is adversely affecting the parties to the dispute 
and third parties.23  The new laws also give the Minister power to terminate a 
bargaining period.  Section 112 allows this to occur upon the Minister being 
satisfied that industrial action is being taken, or is threatened or probable, and 
such action is or would adversely affect the negotiating parties, provided the 
action would endanger the life or safety of some Australians, or cause 
significant damage to the Australian economy.  The declaration is effective 
immediately.  The effect is if workers continue to engage in industrial action 
after such a declaration, they are then engaged in unprotected industrial action, 
and can be sued and/or dismissed as a result. 
 
Part VI of the Act makes provision for awards, focusing on their simplification 
and rationalisation.  The amendments seek to reduce the number of awards, 
which currently total more than 4000 (Federal and State).  Awards will be 
restricted in their content to 13 matters,24 a reduction from the current 20.  Some 
topics are specifically excluded from awards.25  These changes will allow a 
                                                 





23 S107G, s107J 
24 Including ordinary hours of work (including rest breaks), incentive-based payments and 
bonuses, annual leave loadings, ceremonial leave, public holidays, allowances for employment-
related expenses, further skill requirements or site conditions, overtime or shift loadings, penalty 
rates, redundancy pay, stand-down provisions, dispute resolution procedures, types of 
employment, and conditions of outworkers (s116).   
25 Including union rights to be involved in dispute resolution procedures, the number or 
proportion of employees that an employer may employ in a particular type of employment (eg 
casual), prohibitions on an employer employing workers in a particular type of employment (eg 
casual), maximum or minimum hours of work for regular part-time employees, restrictions on 
further increase in the number of employees employed on part-time and casual 
arrangements.  Australia already has one of the highest percentages of 
casualised workforce in the world.26  Awards must not in future refer to State or 
Territory boundaries in their terms and conditions.27
 
The amending legislation places restrictions on the right of a union 
representative to enter a workplace.28  Such a person will need to have a permit 
to do so, which is good for three years.29  In order to obtain a permit, the 
Registrar must be satisfied the applicant is a fit and proper person.30  The Act 
allows the permit holder to enter business premises if satisfied on reasonable 
grounds that a breach of the Act, an AWA, or an award or collective agreement 
is occurring on the premises.31
 
An employer has the right under the new laws to request an employee to work 
on a particular public holiday.  The employee will no longer be guaranteed 
penalty rates for so doing, but these may be negotiated.  The Act (as amended 
by the Senate) allows the employee to refuse the request, and take the day off, if 
they have reasonable grounds for so doing.32
 
In terms of transitional provisions, the Act lays down special rules for workers 
who were, at the time the amendments were passed, subject to an individual 
State employment agreement or a collective State employment agreement.  
These workers are able to take advantage of any State law conferring rights 
regarding annual leave, leave loadings, parental or carer’s leave, termination 
notice, redundancy pay, overtime or shift loadings, penalty rates, or rest breaks 
for either the duration of the agreement, a maximum of three years after the 
agreement was made, when the agreement is terminated or when a new one is 
negotiated, whichever is earliest.33  Similar protections have been extended to 
those subject to a State award. 
 
As amended, the amendments exclude small businesses, defined as those with 
fewer than 15 employees, of the need to pay redundancy pay.34  Further, the Act 
limits the application of unfair dismissal rules, by restricting them only to 
employers of more than 100 staff.  Further, the maximum acceptable 
probationary period (during which time the unfair dismissal rules do not apply) 
at the commencement of an employee’s employment has been increased from 
three to six months. 
                                                                                                                                  
the engagement of independent contractors, and restrictions on the engagement of labour hire 
workers (s116B). 
26 Refer to footnote 102 
27 S118A, reflecting a clear attempt to ‘nationalise’ working conditions in Australia. 
28 Freedom to join or not join a union remains an important feature of the law (s239).  No 
employee can be dismissed for joining, or failing to join, a union (s253-254) 
29 S204 
30 S203 
31 S208.  The permit holder then has a right to interview relevant personnel in the workplace, 
inspect or request to inspect relevant records, or view any work, material or appliance relevant 
to the suspected breach.  The organisation visited has a right to request to sight the permit 
holder’s authority documents. 
32 S170AE; the employer cannot prejudice the employee for so doing (s170AI) 
33 Schedule 15 
34 Part VIAAA 
 
Constitutionality of Provisions 
One of the key sections affecting the constitutionality of the amendments is 
s4AB, which defines the meaning of ‘employer’ for the purposes of the 
amendments.  The Act is built on the meaning of employer and employee so the 
definition is crucial. 
 
Employer is defined to mean: 
(a) a constitutional corporation, so far as it employs, or usually employs, an individual; 
(b) the Commonwealth, so far as it employs, or usually employs, an individual; 
(c) a Commonwealth authority, so far as it employs, or usually employs, an individual; or 
(d) a person or entity so far as the person or entity, in connection with constitutional trade 
or commerce, employs, or usually employs, an individual as a flight crew officer, 
maritime worker or waterside worker; 
(e) a body corporate incorporated in a Territory, so far as the body employs, or usually 
employs, an individual; or 
(f) a person or entity that carries on an activity in a Territory in Australia, so far as the 
person or entity employs, or usually employs, an individual in connection with the 
activity carried on in the Territory. 
 
The definition of ‘employee’ for the purposes of the legislation links with the 
above definition.35
 
As drafted, the scheme of the amending Act clearly seeks to rely on three heads 
of Commonwealth power.  The main head used (referred to in (a) above) in the 
definition of employer) is the corporations power, and most attention will be 
paid to this argument in the paper.  Other heads of power, namely the Territories 
power and trade and commerce power, will briefly be considered.  Of course, 
the Commonwealth will not seek to rely on the direct power it has over 
industrial relations in the Constitution.  This power is limited to conciliation and 
arbitration of industrial disputes, which implies the involvement of a third party 
in the prevention and settlement of disputes.  This does not easily with the 
intention behind these changes, which is to encourage workplace bargaining at 
the enterprise level.36  The likelihood that each of these powers will support the 
new laws will now be considered.   
 
(a) Territories Power 
Clearly, subsections (e) and (f) of the definition of employer in the amended act 
seek to rely on the territories power.  Dicta in various cases suggests that s122 
could be used to validate the above provisions, at least so far as they apply to 
either bodies corporate incorporated in a Territory, or those carrying on an 
activity in a Territory.  Section 122 has been held to be an extremely broad 
power, certainly not constrained by subject matter37 and perhaps not constrained 
by other sections of the Constitution. For example, in Davis v 
Commonwealth,38 the High Court found that s122 could extend to the 
incorporation of a corporation in the Australian Capital Territory, and to the 
                                                 
35 S4AA defines an employee as a person usually employed by an employer as defined in s4AB.  
Further, ‘employment’ is defined in s4AC to mean the employment of an employee (as defined) 
by an employer (as defined). 
36 s51(35) is the conciliation and arbitration power  
37 Spratt v Hermes (1965) 114 CLR 226 (Barwick CJ 241-242) 
38 (1988) 166 CLR 79 
protection of its corporate name and symbols.39  It is submitted that if the 
Commonwealth can control incorporation within the Territory, it could control 
things the Territory-incorporated body might do once incorporated (such as 
employ staff).  Similarly, if the Commonwealth can rely on s122 to protect a 
corporation’s name and symbols, surely it can control activities a corporation 
(or any business) might carry on, at least within the Territory. 
 
In other contexts involving s122, members of the High Court have spoken of the 
need for ‘sufficient nexus’ between the law and the territory.40
 
Perhaps the only difficulty confronting the Act’s application to the Territories 
would occur if the law was not held to be supported by the other heads of 
power, namely s51(1) and (20).  For in that case, an issue would arise as to 
whether it was intended that the Act apply to the territories only if it applied 
elsewhere in Australia, or whether it was intended to apply to the territories 
regardless.41  Arguably, given that parts of the employer definition dealing with 
territories apply to corporations, other entities and individuals alike, it was 
intended that the territories provisions were intended to stand alone, and not be 
read only with the other provisions.42  There is authority for the proposition that 
the s122 power should not be subject to limits imposed on s51 heads of 
power.43
 
(b) Corporations Power 
Given the definition of employer and employee, the Act has clearly been written 
in reliance largely on the s51(20) corporations power.  This is not surprising, 
since it has been estimated by the Federal Government that corporations employ 
between 85-90% of non-farm labour in Australia.44  It could thus support 
application of the law to the vast majority of employment relationships in 
Australia – on the proviso that the corporations power extends to making laws 
about the working conditions of corporations,45 and that the organisation in 
                                                 
39 Mason CJ Deane and Gaudron JJ (97), Brennan Toohey (117) 
 
40 Eg Brennan J in Newcrest Mining (WA) Limited v Commonwealth of Australia (1997) 190 
CLR 513 (Newcrest Mining): “the nexus which is sufficient to attract the support of s122 to a 
law providing for the compulsory acquisition of property is that the property be situated within 
the Territory … if the territories power could be exercised to acquire property in a State, it could 
distort or affect the operation of those provisions of the Constitution which express the federal 
compact and protect the constitutional interests of those living under it”; to like effect Dawson J 
“all that need to be shown to support an exercise of the power under s122 is that there is a 
sufficient nexus or connection between the resultant law and any territory” 
41 Spratt v Hermes (1965) 114 CLR 226,278 – Windeyer J considered this matter, concluding 
that if s51 did not support the non-territorial aspects of the law, s122 would not support the 
territorial aspects unless there was a clear indication that the law should nevertheless apply in 
the territories.   
42 If precedent is required, the court in the Australian National Airlines Commission (ANAC) 
case declared the law invalid, except as it was supported by s122: Attorney-General (WA) v 
ANAC (1976) 138 CLR 492 
43 Brennan CJ, Dawson Toohey McHugh JJ in Newcrest Mining; Attorney-General (WA) v 
ANAC, n39, p513 (Stephen J) and p525 (Mason J)  
44 Breaking the Gridlock: Towards a Simpler National Workplace Relations System Discussion 
Paper 1: The Case for Change (Canberra October 2000, then Minister for Employment, 
Workplace Relations and Small Business Peter Reith) 
45 Or more precisely, constitutional corporations (ie trading or financial corporations) 
issue fits the definition of being a trading or financial corporation.46  To the 
extent that the new laws punish the conduct of individuals, there is precedent 
allowing for laws operating on individuals to be supported by the corporations 
power.47
 
In more than 100 years of jurisprudence, the High Court has never answered 
this question ie whether the Commonwealth can regulate the working conditions 
of employees of constitutional corporations, definitively, hence uncertainty 
remains.  The issue was mentioned in Victoria v Commonwealth (Industrial 
Relations Act Case),48 but did not arise for determination, because the plaintiff 
conceded that s51(20) could be used to regulate working conditions of 
employees of corporations.  The High Court did not decide the matter: 
 
If, as is conceded, the Parliament can legislate pursuant to s51(20) … as to the 
industrial rights and obligations of employees and employer corporations of the 
kind specified in s51(20) … it can also legislate … as to the conditions to attach 
to those rights and obligations.49
 
Dicta in some High Court decisions indicates support for the view that the 
Commonwealth may use its corporations head in the industrial relations arena.  
In the early case of Huddart Parker and Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead50 concerning 
anti-competitive regulation of corporations, Griffith CJ commented that 
 
The Commonwealth Parliament can make any laws it thinks fit with regard to the 
operation of the corporation, for example may prescribe what officers and servants 
it shall employ, what shall be the hours and conditions of labour, what 
remuneration shall be paid to them.51
 
In Re Dingjan ex parte Wagner,52 the Court considered a law giving the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission power to review employment 
contracts of employees.  Importantly, the power was not confined only to 
contracts involving a constitutional corporation.53  The High Court found 4-3 
that the legislation was invalid.  Yet even here can be found broad expressions 
of support for the Commonwealth’s ability to regulate working conditions under 
s51(20).  In the majority, Brennan J agreed that ‘a law conferring power to vary 
                                                 
46 This issue is largely settled law and is not explored further in the article – case examples 
include R v Trade Practices Tribunal; ex parte St George County Council (1974) 130 CLR 533 
and R v Federal Court of Australia; Ex Parte WA National Football League (Inc) (1979) 143 
CLR 190 
47 Eg R v Australian Industrial Court; ex parte CLM Holdings Pty Ltd (1977) 136 CLR 235; 
Actors’ Equity v Fontana Films Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 169 
48 (1996) 187 CLR 416 
49 539 (per Brennan CJ Toohey Gaudron McHugh and Gummow JJ) 
50 (1909) 8 CLR 330 (Huddart Parker) 
51 348.  The High Court found the legislation to be invalid as not supported by s51(20), but the 
actual decision reached can be largely ignored given the court was clearly influenced at the time 
by the reserved powers heresy eventually rejected by the Court in the Engineers case 
52 (1985) 183 CLR 323 (Re Dingjan) 
53 Section 127A(2)(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) gave the Industrial Relations 
Commission power to review a contract on the grounds that it was unfair, harsh or against the 
public interest.  The power of review was expressed to apply only to (a) in relation to a contract 
to which a constitutional corporation is a party (b) in relation to a contract relating to the 
business of a constitutional corporation (c) in relation to a contract entered into by a 
constitutional corporation for the purposes of its business, as well as others. 
… a contract between a constitutional corporation and an independent 
contractor for work to be done for the purposes of the corporation’s business’54 
(italics added) would be supported by the corporations power.  It is submitted 
that in this context there is no relevant difference between a contract of 
engagement of an independent contractor, and a contract of employment.  In 
both cases, the person is engaged for the purposes of the corporation’s business. 
 
Brennan J’s reference here to the fact that corporations employ workers for the 
purposes of their trading activities reflects a previous debate about the extent of 
the corporations power, and whether it extends only to regulating trading 
activities of the corporation, or would include non-trading activities also.  
Differences of opinion emerged on the High Court on this issue in the 1980s in 
the Actors Equity55 and Tasmanian Dams56 Case.  Though various views were 
canvassed by the judges, there emerged from the Tasmanian Dams case a 
majority view that the Commonwealth can regulate both trading activities and 
non-trading activities carried out for the purposes of trade.57   
 
It would be hard to argue with the statement that a trading corporation employs 
staff for the purposes of trade – of course it must do so as corporations can only 
act through individuals.  The author could not support an approach which asks 
which employees’ functions are directly related to trading activities and which 
are more indirect – he considers this would be an unproductive exercise 
requiring the drawing of fine and quite arbitrary lines.  Broadly, it is suggested 
that a trading corporation employs all of its staff for the purposes of trade, and 
so the working conditions of all of that corporation’s staff are the legitimate 
concern of the Commonwealth under s51(20).   
 
There appears to be a majority of the High Court in Dingjan prepared to accept 
the ability of the Commonwealth, to regulate, at least, the employment 
conditions of those employed by constitutional corporations.  The dissenters 
clearly would, as they concluded the Commonwealth could also regulate the 
working conditions of sub-contractors to constitutional corporations under the 
corporations power.58  In addition, of the majority in that case, McHugh J 
clearly believed the Commonwealth could rely on s51(20) to regulate the 
                                                 
54 Re Dingjan (339), similarly McHugh J ‘where a law seeks to regulate the conduct of persons 
other than s51(20) corporations or the employees, officers or shareholders of those corporations, 
the law will generally not be authorised by s51(20)’ – or in other words, if the law did seek to 
regulate the conduct of s51(20) corporations or their employees, it seems the law would be 
valid.   
55 Actors’ and Announcers Equity Association v Fontana Films Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 169 
56 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 
57 Mason Murphy Brennan and Deane JJ.  Mason Murphy and Deane JJ would go further, 
finding that the Commonwealth could under its corporations power regulate all non-trading 
activities of a constitutional corporation.  However, at present this is not a majority view.  (In 
the interests of clarity, the author notes the view that the Commonwealth can only regulate 
trading activities of a constitutional corporation  is also a minority view).  See for further 
discussion Anthony Gray ‘Precedent and Policy: Australian Industrial Relations Reform in the 
21st Century Using the Corporations Power’ (2005) 10 (2) Deakin Law Review 440, George 
Williams ‘The Constitution and a National Industrial Relations Regime’ (2005) 10 (2) Deakin 
Law Review 498; and  Ron McCallum ‘The Australian Constitution and the Shaping of Our 
Federal and State Labour Laws’ (2005) 10 (2) Deakin Law Review 460 
58 Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ 
employment conditions of those working for a corporation,59 as did Brennan 
J.60  Thus, five of the seven judges in Dingjan expressly confirmed the 
Commonwealth’s ability to legislate regarding working conditions of those who 
work for a corporation.  Again, it is not submitted to be material constitutionally 
whether those persons are engaged under an employment contract or as an 
independent contractor. 
 
The author considers that those who seek to challenge the validity of the 
legislation arguing that the corporations power does not support the law have 
two main grounds of attack: 
(a) the internal/external distinction  
(b) the law does not sufficiently discriminate/not sufficient connection with 
corporations 
 
These arguments will now be canvassed. 
 
Argument 1 Historical Internal/External Distinction 
This argument is rooted in the very first High Court decision dealing with the 
corporations power, Huddart Parker.  In that case, Isaacs J rejected the 
suggestion that the Commonwealth might regulate industrial relations of 
corporations.  He viewed the power narrowly to include only the outward 
exercise of a corporation’s faculties and capacities.  What he considered to be 
inward or internal matters concerning a company were, in his view, a matter for 
the States and not the Commonwealth to regulate.   He specifically rejected the 
argument that the Commonwealth could prescribe a schedule of wages and 
hours for these corporations for the reason that 
 
(it) is purely internal management and equipment, and in no way directly affects the 
exercise of their capacities of trading and their financial operations or other public 
capacities, nor is it incidental to the control of their activities61
 
Consistently, Isaacs J held that the incorporation of corporations, being an 
‘internal matter’, was also a matter for the States.  His decision in Huddart 
Parker is worth considering because at least to the extent of the argument in the 
previous sentence, his views were upheld by the High Court in the 
Incorporation Case where the High Court scuttled the Commonwealth’s 
original Corporations Act on the basis s51(20) did not support laws for the 
incorporation of a company.62  This came as a surprise to the Commonwealth, 
and those wishing to challenge the 2005 amendments will no doubt ask the 
court to adopt more of the reasoning of Isaacs J in Huddart, specifically to 
                                                 
59 ‘if, by reference to the activities or functions of s51(20) corporations, a law regulates the 
conduct of those who control, work for (emphasis added), or hold shares or office in those 
corporations, it is unlikely that any further fact will be needed to bring the law within the reach 
of s51(20)’ (369) 
60 ‘a law conferring power to vary or set aside a contract between a constitutional corporation 
and an independent contractor for work to be done for the purposes of the corporation’s business 
where the contract is unfair or harsh or contrary to the public interest would be a law supported 
by s51(20)’ (339). 
61 396.  More recently, the High Court has viewed a company’s relations with its employees as 
an act in trade and commerce rather than a purely internal act:  Concrete Constructions v Nelson 
(1990) 169 CLR 595 
62 New South Wales v Commonwealth (1990) 169 CLR 482 
recognise the distinction between internal matters of a corporation (which they 
would argue are reserved to the States) and a corporation’s relations with 
outsiders (which are conceded to be a proper role for the Commonwealth).63
 
However, there are strong reasons for believing the High Court will not adopt 
the view of Isaacs J to this extent.  Firstly, there is a lack of historical evidence 
to support the position of Isaacs J.64  The actual decision in Huddart Parker has 
been expressly overruled by the High Court65, and is now recognised as being 
unacceptably tainted by the reserved powers heresy that characterised the first 
twenty years of the High Court’s interpretation of the Constitution.   
 
Further, there is ample support for the High Court’s view in the Incorporation 
Act case that the Commonwealth did not have power over the incorporation 
process.  First, s51(20) refers to the ability of the Commonwealth to make laws 
in respect of trading corporations formed within the Commonwealth.  A plain 
reading of the words66 would give most readers the impression that the 
Commonwealth could only legislate in respect of already formed corporations.  
However, a plain reading of the section does not disclose any distinction 
intended or implied between matters internal to a corporation and the external 
transactions to which the corporation is a party.  The High Court has made it 
clear that the Constitution is to read free of unexpressed assumptions – it 
discarded the reserved powers and implied immunities assumptions as not being 
supported by the written words of the Constitution (in an industrial relations 
case); it would seem at the very least bizarre to re-introduce different 
assumptions plainly again not supported by anything actually written in the 
Constitution, presumably with the same (discredited) intention of preserving an 
area of regulation to the States.67  It is thus considered unlikely that the States 
seeking to challenge the legislation on this basis would be successful. 
                                                 
63 Zines has also made this link, suggesting that if the States have sole authority to create trading 
and financial corporations, it is not unreasonable to argue that those ‘matters which are part and 
parcel of creating a corporation and without which the corporation would be an empty shell, 
incapable of functioning as a juristic person at all, are similarly outside Commonwealth power’: 
The High Court and the Constitution (4th ed, 1997) p106 
64 What is now s51(20) is based on s15(i) of the Federal Council of Australasia Act 1885 (Imp), 
included in cl 52 of the Constitution presented to the 1891 Convention.  The provision referred 
to a power to legislate in respect of the status of foreign corporations and corporations formed in 
any State or part of the Commonwealth.  The word trading was added at the 1891 Convention:  
S Corcoran Corporate Law and the Australian Corporation: A History of s51(20) of the 
Australian Constitution (1994) 15 Journal of Legal History 131 
65 Strickland v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd (1971) 124 CLR 468 
66 The correct approach to interpretation of the Constitution:  Amalgamated Society of Engineers 
v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (Engineers Case)(1920) 28 CLR 129 
67 Gaudron J (with whom Deane J agreed) in Re Dingjan cautioned that s51(20) must be 
approached on the basis that it is construed according to its terms and not by reference to 
‘unnecessary implications and limitations’ (364); similarly Zines ‘It is difficult to see how the 
concept of the federal balance can assist the construction of the power.  There is nothing in the 
concept of federalism itself from which one can derive the view that certain activities of 51(20) 
corporations are required to be within the exclusive power of the States.  That conclusion can 
only be reached if one assumes that certain areas should remain outside Commonwealth control 
– an assumption which does not derive from anything in the Constitution.  It must ultimately 
rest on .. a doctrine of State reserved powers which in the end ultimately leaves the matter to the 
judge’s intuitions or predilections:  ‘The State of Constitutional Interpretation’ (1984) 17 
Federal Law Review 277,280 
 
Argument 2: Law is not Sufficiently Connected With Corporations 
Another possible basis for challenging the new law is that it is not sufficiently 
connected with corporations.  Past High Court Justices Gibbs and Dawson made 
comments in Dingjan broadly supportive of such a view of s51(20). 
 
The argument might start with the accepted proposition that the mere fact that a 
law is addressed to constitutional corporations does not mean that the law is 
automatically supported by s51(20).68  The argument might continue with the 
proposition that the fact the corporation is a trading corporation must be 
significant in the way in which the law relates to it,69 (in order for the law to be 
supported by s51(20)), or in other words the nature of a corporation must be 
significant as an element in the conduct the law seeks to regulate.70  In declaring 
invalid the law challenged in Re Dingjan, Dawson J for example found that  
 
The nature, indeed the existence, of a corporation is not in these circumstances 
significant as an element in the conduct which the law is attempting to regulate.  
The required relationship is adopted merely as a means of introducing 
constitutional corporations as a peg upon which to hang legislation, not upon the 
subject of constitutional corporations, but upon an entirely different subject.71
  
So the argument may be that the law is about the industrial conditions of 
workers, and the relations between employer and employee.  Thus the law 
should be characterised as being one about industrial relations rather than 
corporations.  Arguably, the Commonwealth has attempted to recite itself into 
power by introducing constitutional corporations as the ‘peg’ upon which to 
hang the legislation, a process to which Dawson J alluded in Re Dingjan.  The 
nature of a corporation is not, the argument runs, inherently significant in the 
way the law works or what it intends to achieve.72  Absent the Constitution, the 
law would apply to the working conditions of all workers, regardless of whether 
their employer was corporatised or not.   
 
This gives the argument its due but it is obvious to the author that this line of 
reasoning is deficient in many respects.  Firstly, it seems to the author (with 
respect) that the assumption underlying the above is that a law can be 
                                                 
68 Strickland v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd (1971) 124 CLR 468 per Barwick CJ (489-490), 
Menzies J at 502-503 and Walsh J at 519 
69 Per Gibbs CJ in Actors and Announcers’ Equity Association v Fontana Films Pty Ltd (1982) 
150 CLR 169, 182-183 (Wilson J agreed) 
70 Dingjan per Dawson J at 347.  However, Toohey J in that case rejected the test as being too 
narrow (352) and it was not applied by the majority of the court.  Brennan J noted that while he 
did not disagree with the formulation, he preferred to express it in terms of discrimination (336) 
ie does the law discriminate between constitutional corporations and other persons, by reference 
to the rights it confers or duties it imposes.  His Honour concluded that a validating connection 
could consist in the differential operation the law has on constitutional corporations (336). 
71 347 
72 This principle derives some support from the Huddart Parker case where Higgins J, for 
example, constrained s51(20) to laws about corporations ‘as corporations’, including status, 
capacity and the conditions on which business was permitted’.  He would leave contracts a 
corporation might enter into (including employment contracts?) to the States (412-414).  
Similarly, O’Connor J found s51(20) could not support a law aimed at the domestic trade of a 
corporation (373-374).  Again, however, the decision has been expressly overruled and is based 
on unacceptable reserved powers reasoning. 
characterised in only one way.  If the essence of a law is industrial relations, it 
cannot be a law about corporations, or supported by the corporations power.  
This assumption is clearly untenable; the High Court has accepted the principle 
of multiple characterisation.73  Secondly, when the High Court has declared the 
motive behind legislation as being irrelevant to its characterisation,74 it is 
thought to unwise to dismiss legislation because it was written in particular 
terms so as to meet questions about its constitutionality.75
 
Thirdly, as indicated, five justices of the High Court in Dingjan (excluding 
Gibbs and Dawson JJ) concluded that the Commonwealth could in fact regulate 
the working conditions of workers of constitutional corporations under s51(20).  
Brennan J, for example, who did not disagree with the above narrow test but 
preferred his own test of whether the law ‘discriminated’ between constitutional 
corporations and others, held this view, as did McHugh J.  Implicitly then, five 
of seven High Court judges have rejected the argument that regulating the 
working conditions of a constitutional corporation’s workers is impossible 
under s51(20) because the law is about industrial relations rather than 
corporations, or that the nature of a corporation in such a case would not be 
relevant in the way the law relates to that organisation, or there is not sufficient 
connection/discrimination between a corporation and other entity.  Clearly, 
there is majority support for the reverse proposition, that a law regulating the 
industrial conditions of employees of constitutional corporations does 
sufficiently relate to the nature of the corporation, and is sufficiently connected 
with a constitutional corporation to be justified by s51(20).76
 
(c) Trade and Commerce Power s51(1) 
Surprisingly,77 there is only minor reliance on the trade and commerce power to 
justify this legislation.  The section 4AB definition of ‘employers’ to whom the 
                                                 
73 Murphyores Inc Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 1.  As an example in the industrial 
relations context, McHugh J was emphatic in Re Dingjan ‘a law that penalises persons who 
impose secondary boycotts that are designed to and likely to cause substantial damage to the 
business of corporations is a law with respect to those corporations, notwithstanding that its 
principal purpose is to outlaw secondary boycotts (368)(the Actors’ Equity situation); as was 
Menzies J in Strickland that a law can be one with respect to corporations even though it is also 
with respect to trade (510). 
74 Eg Fairfax v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1965) 114 CLR 1 
75 Gibbs CJ in the Tasmanian Dams case upheld parts of the law based on s51(20) 
‘notwithstanding some doubts as to whether the connection made by (the section) with trading 
corporations by the use of those words ‘for the purposes of its trading activity’ is merely 
contrived (119).  However, the author with respect agrees with the reply by Zines that 
‘whenever the Commonwealth is forced to limit the operation of an Act to the field covered by 
the subject of a power, the total effect may be seen as contrived’ (The High Court and the 
Constitution)(4th ed, 1997) p94 
76 This article will not consider the old argument that laws under s51(20) are confined to 
regulating the trading activities of corporations ONLY because it is considered the argument 
was rejected by a majority of the High Court in the Tasmanian Dams Case (Commonwealth v 
Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 per Mason Brennan Deane and Murphy JJ, Gibbs CJ Wilson 
Dawson JJ dissenting), with no sign since of majority support on the High Court for such a 
view.  Such a narrow view is clearly not supported by anything express in the Constitution, nor 
do the Convention Debates assist. 
77 It is perhaps explained by historical reasons, given that particular industrial relations issues 
have arisen in the past in the context of airline and maritime employees.  It is also much easier 
to make the overseas or interstate link with such workers. 
Act applies includes a reference in subsection (d) to constitutional trade and 
commerce, but only in relation to flight crew and maritime workers.  Hence the 
discussion of s51(1) will be short. 
 
It seems that the Federal Government will be able to rely on the High Court’s 
decision in Re Maritime Union of Australia; ex parte CSL Pacific Shipping 
Inc78 to support this sub-section.  There the High Court was in no doubt that 
 
A ship journeying for reward is in commerce; those who co-operate in the 
journeying of the ship are in commerce and the wages of those persons and the 
conditions of their employment relate to that commerce. 
 
There is other authority confirming the ability of the Commonwealth to regulate 
the working conditions of employees engaged in constitutional trade and 
commerce.79
 
The author believes the Commonwealth could have relied on s51(1) to a greater 
extent than it has in passing these laws, but the Commonwealth would no doubt 
have been aware of the strict distinction that in the past has been upheld in 
s51(1) cases regarding, on the one hand, interstate and overseas trade and 
commerce,80 and on the other, intrastate trade and commerce.81  This explains 
why the definition of employer is as it is in the new law; there could be no 
argument that flight crew (at least, those involved in interstate or overseas 
flights)82 and maritime workers (presuming their activities relate, or relate 
largely, to ships travelling overseas and/or interstate) are involved in 
constitutional trade and commerce.  There continues to be controversy, where a 
business is involved in a combination of constitutional and non-constitutional 
trade and commerce, about the extent to which the Commonwealth can regulate 
the business’s activities,83 which would include its employee relations.  No 
doubt s51(1) might well be expanded in future to allow the Commonwealth 
greater regulation over economic affairs,84 but at present the Commonwealth 
clearly believes its corporations power gives it the best opportunity to effect the 
kinds of workplace changes it wishes. 
 
                                                 
78 [2003] HCA 43 
79 For example Australian Steamships Limited v Malcolm (1914) 19 CLR 298; R v Foster; ex 
parte Commonwealth Life (Amalgamated) Insurances Ltd (1952) 85 CLR 138.  A similar result 
has been reached in the United States – see for example National Labor Relations Board v 
Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp (1937) 301 US 1; Wickard v Filburn (1942) 317 US 111 
80 Hereafter ‘constitutional trade and commerce’ 
81 Hereafter ‘non-constitutional trade and commerce’ 
82 Airlines of NSW Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 2)(1965) 113 CLR 54 
83 Eg Airlines of NSW Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 2)(1965) 113 CLR 54; Wragg v New 
South Wales (1953) 88 CLR 353, 385-386 (Dixon CJ, with whom McTiernan Williams Fullagar 
and Kitto JJ agreed); Redfern v Dunlop Rubber Australian Ltd (1964) 110 CLR 194; Swift 
Australian Co Pty Ltd v Boyd-Parkinson (1962) 108 CLR 189.  This issue is further discussed in 
David McCann ‘First Head Revisited: A Single Industrial Relations System Under the Trade 
and Commerce Power’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 75 
84 There would be support from commentators such as Sir Anthony Mason (‘Role of a 
Constitutional Court in a Federation’ (1986) 16 Federal Law Review 12; Geoffrey Sawer 
Australian Federalism in the Courts (1967) p206,  Leslie Zines The High Court and the 
Constitution (1997, 4th ed) p79; and George Williams Labour Law and the Constitution (2000) 
p144 
 
Likely Economic Impacts of Legislation and its Relevance to the Constitutional 
Question 
Legal principles do not operate in a vacuum.  It is submitted to be naïve for a 
court to consider the question of the constitutionality of the amending 
legislation by considering merely past legal decisions on the scope of the 
corporations and other powers.  The proposed legislation clearly has broad 
consequences for society and as a result, the desirability from a policy point of 
view, if not the desirability of the particular provisions, of having federal 
regulation of workplace relations matters is submitted to be a relevant factor in 
assessing the question of its constitutionality.  Policy arguments are of course 
relevant in the High Court.  Arguably, this is even more so where there is 
ambiguity. 
 
The High Court has in the past shown an awareness of economic issues as being 
relevant to interpretation of the Constitution,85 (at least on some occasions),86 
and perhaps an awareness that most Australians look to the Commonwealth in 
relation to economic management.  It is of course worth remembering that the 
Constitution gives the Commonwealth no direct powers over the ‘economy’, so 
                                                 
85 The best examples of this occur in cases involving ss 90 and 92 of the Constitution.  In 
relation to s90 for example, one notes the decision in  Parton v Milk Board (Vic) (1949) 80 CLR 
229,260 ‘in making the power of the (Commonwealth Parliament) to impose duties of customs 
and of excise exclusive it may be assumed that it was intended to give the Parliament a real 
control of the taxation of commodities and to ensure that the execution of whatever policy is 
adopted should not be hampered or defeated by State action’.  This implicit recognition by 
Dixon J of economic arguments in formulating a broad approach to s90 was accepted by the 
High Court in that case, but directly challenged (unsuccessfully) by the States in cases such as 
Capital Duplicators Pty Ltd v ACT (No 2) (1993) 178 CLR 561 (Mason CJ Brennan Deane and 
McHugh JJ, Dawson Toohey and Gaudron JJ dissenting) specifically endorsing Dixon J’s view 
of the purpose of s90 (589); and see also Ha v New South Wales (1997) 189 CLR 465 where a 
majority of the High Court (Brennan CJ McHugh Gummow and Kirby JJ; Dawson Toohey and 
Gaudron JJ dissenting) rejected a direct challenge to the judgment of Dixon J and other 
members of the High Court in Parton.    
 
Some examples of references to economic arguments in s92 jurisprudence include the Privy 
Council in Commonwealth v Bank of New South Wales (1949) 79 CLR 497 who, in referring to 
s92, concluded that the ‘problem to be solved will often be not so much legal as political, social 
or economic’ (639), as well as judgments in Uebergang v Australian Wheat Board (1980) 140 
CLR 120, Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 29, Clark King 
and Co Pty Ltd v Australian Wheat Board (1978) 140 CLR 120 (particularly Barwick CJ at 154, 
Stephen J at 174-176, and Mason and Jacobs JJ at 191-192); and SOS (Mowbray) Pty Ltd v 
Mead (1972) 124 CLR 529 (particularly Barwick CJ at 550-551).   Dixon CJ accepted economic 
arguments as valid in interpreting s51(1) in Wragge v State of New South Wales (1953) 88 CLR 
353, 386.  Leslie Zines is in favour of considering economic factors, at least in relation to 
s51(1): see The High Court and the Constitution (4th ed, 1997) p78-79.  The United States 
Supreme Court has been prepared to accept economic arguments as assisting in interpretation of 
the Constitution in Wickard v Filburn (1942) 317 US 111 (concluding the appellee’s activity 
could be regulated by Congress if ‘it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate 
commerce’)(124-125)(a commerce clause case), and National Labour Relations Board v Jones 
and Laughlin Steel Corporation (1937) 298 US 1. 
86 The High Court has not been so keen on using economic arguments to reach a view of the 
s51(1) trade and commerce power:  see for example Attorney-General (WA) v Australian 
National Airlines Commission (1976) 138 CLR 492 
the Commonwealth’s management of the economy must be indirectly through 
other heads of power.87
The point to be noted in the following discussion is the extent to which 
management of industrial relations is a useful tool for the Commonwealth in 
regulation of the economy, whatever we think of the merits of the actual law. 
 
At the heart of these reforms is the continued movement away from collective 
bargaining to individual workplace bargaining.  Some studies have considered 
the economic effects of such a move, including the experience with Australian 
Workplace Agreements (AWAs) since their inception in 1996, and State-
equivalents. 
 
One study surveyed 2000 employers who had offered an AWA to at least one 
staff member, with almost 700 responses.  Respondents were asked why they 
introduced AWAs.  High numbers mentioned flexibility (45%), to simplify 
employment opportunities (42%), to obtain better organisational outcomes 
(40%), to implement management strategy (39%) and to improve employee-
management relations (36%).  Only 18% mentioned containment of labour 
costs.88  Two third of respondents planned to introduce more AWAs within the 
next two years. 
 
Assessing the likely impact of the move to individual workplace bargaining on 
wage levels has proven more contentious.  It is clearly misleading to simply 
compare the wage levels of those on AWAs with those not on individual 
agreements, since many of those employees currently on individual workplace 
agreements are at the managerial or professional level.  One survey found 
employees covered by awards secured an average wage rise of 1.3% while those 
on individual agreements received between 0 and 8%.89  Others have found that 
employees covered by union-negotiated collective agreements have received 
higher wage increases than those on non-union negotiated or individual 
contracts,90  or that pay rises within the life of an AWA tend to be lower than 
what the worker would have received under a collective bargaining 
agreement.91  Some have linked increased workplace deregulation with an 
increase in working hours, increasing stress and negatively affecting work-
                                                 
87 Hopefully also, through co-operation with the States, though this has been more of a 
challenge! 
88 Paul Gollan ‘Trends in Processes in the Making of Australian Workplace Agreements: 
Information and Findings from a Survey into Processes in Making and Outcomes of Australian 
Workplace Agreements’, November 2000 
89 Buchanan, J, Van Barneveld, K, O’Loughlin, T and Pragnell, B ‘Wages Policy and Wage 
Determination in 1996’ (1997) 39 Journal of Industrial Relations 96 
90 David Peetz ‘Individual Contracts, Collective Bargaining, Wages and Power’ (2001) 
Discussion Paper 437, Centre for Economic Policy Research, ANU 
91 Kristin Van Barneveld and Betty Arsovska ‘AWAs: Changing the Structure of Wages?’, 
citing a 80% incidence of provision for quantifiable wage increases during the life of a union-
agreement, 63% incidence during the life of a non-union agreement, and 26% incidence during 
the life of an AWA.  (However, the same survey found a much larger incidence of a loaded rate 
for workers, to compensate for the lack of penalty rates, overtime etc in AWAs (27%) compared 
with union agreements (7%) or non-union agreements (6%).   On the same topic, see Amanda 
Roan, Tom Bramble and George Lafferty ‘Australian Workplace Agreements in Practice: The 
Hard and Soft Dimensions’ (2001) 43 (4) Journal of Industrial Relations 487 (December) 
family balance.92  Others have argued that labour market deregulation has 
increased ‘wage dispersion’ in the economy, with high wage earners (higher 
skilled?) enjoying higher relative wage increases than lower wage earners.93
 
Some commentators have claimed a strong link between flexibility in labour 
markets and productivity.94  Ryan, for example, concluded that during the 1990s 
in Australia those sectors with the most flexible workforce arrangements saw 
the fastest productivity gains.95  Australia also has relatively low participation 
rates – in 2003, Australia had 69% of its working age population in 
employment, compared with 71% in the United States and 73% in the United 
Kingdom.96  If our participation rate had been that of the United Kingdom, it is 
said that the numbers employed would have increased by 400 000 (about 2/3 of 
those currently unemployed).97  Moore blames Australia’s relatively low 
participation rate on, among other things, an overly regulated labour market. 
 
It has also been noted that Australia’s minimum wage rates are relatively high 
on a worldwide scale.  Of 13 OECD countries surveyed in 2004 by the United 
Kingdom Low Pay Commission, Australia had the highest adult minimum wage 
relative to full-time earnings.98  Australia’s minimum wage to median earnings 
ratio of almost 60% is said to price many of the unemployed out of the labour 
market.  As previously mentioned, one of the main objects of the new 
legislation is to transfer power to set minimum wages from the Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) to the new Australian Fair Pay 
Commission.)99  Reflecting on the AIRC’s past record in wage setting, Wooden 
concluded 
 
                                                 
92 Morehead, A, Steele, M, Alexander, M, Stephen, K and Duffin, L ‘Changes at Work: The 
1995 Australian Workplace Industrial Relattions Survey’ Longman, Melbourne; Amanda Roan, 
Tom Bramble and George Lafferty ‘Australian Workplace Agreements in Practice: The Hard 
and Soft Dimensions’ (2001) 43 (4) Journal of Industrial Relations 387 
93 A Stegman and T Stegman ‘Labour Market Reform and the Macroeconomic Efficiency of the 
Labour Market in Australia’ (2004) 28 (5) Cambridge Journal of Economics 743 
94 Others, while noting increases in Australian worker productivity occurred during the 1990s at 
a time of labour market reform, argue that there were many factors causing the increase in 
productivity, such that the link between labour market reform and increased productivity is not 
clear: see Stegman and Stegman ‘Labour Market Reform and the Macroeconomic Efficiency of 
the Labour Market in Australia’ (2004) 28 Cambridge Journal of Economics 743 
95 Matthew Ryan, ‘Workplace Relations Reform, Prosperity and Fairness’ (2005) 38 (2) 
Australian Economic Review 201,203.  Refer also to Mark Wooden The Transformation of 
Australian Industrial Relations (2000) pp151-154, though it is difficult to prove that 
productivity increases were caused by any individual factor, and to what extent, given the issue 
of productivity is a complex one with a myriad of factors affecting it. 
96 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development OECD Employment Outlook, 
OECD, Paris 
97 Des Moore ‘Why Labour Market Players Should Have Freedom to Contract’ (2005) 38 (2) 
Australian Economic Review 192,195 
98 UK Low Pay Commission 2005 National Minimum Wage: Low Pay Commission Report, 
London (other countries surveyed were France, New Zealand, Ireland, Belgium, Greece, 
Netherlands, United Kingdom, Canada, Portugal, Japan, United States and Spain) 
99 S7J(a) and (b).  Des Moore suggested that the AIRC, given its past track record, was not the 
appropriate body to set minimum wage levels:  ‘’Why Labour Market Players Should Have 
Freedom to Contract’ (2005) 38 (2) Australian Economic Review 192, 198 
The actions of the AIRC, however, in persistently raising the federal minimum wage over time 
indicate that either it does not care about the jobless or that it believes there is no relation 
between the price of labour and the quantity demanded.100
 
Obviously, this affects the ability of Australian business to compete globally.  It 
has been estimated that if Australia’s minimum wage were lowered to match 
that of the United States and United Kingdom, an extra 100 000 Australians 
would be employed.101  Some have noted it is dangerous to attempt to improve 
social equality by increasing the minimum wage, since many on the minimum 
wage in fact live in high income households.102  It may be better to address 
social equality through the welfare system than through the industrial relations 
system. 
 
Others argue that the changes simply reflect changes in labour market reality in 
recent years.  For example, given that the number of skill-based and knowledge-
based jobs has grown exponentially at the expense of jobs requiring minimal 
skills, this arguably explains why there is lesser need for union activity than 
previous models allowed.  As Mark Wooden concludes 
 
These more skilled workers can be expected to exhibit less interest in the 
protections offered by award regulation and third-party arbitration; the 
possession of valued work skills is all the protection many of these workers need 
… The rising skill premium increases the incentive for employers to recruit the 
best person for the job and thus creates a greater need for differentiation of pay 
across both individuals and enterprises.103
 
The changes clearly aim to increase flexibility in employment by encouraging 
employers to hire part-time and casual employees, as well as increasing the 
                                                 
100 Mark Wooden ‘Workplace Relations Reform: Where to Now?’ (2005) 38 (2) Australian 
Economic Review 176,178-179.  Wooden then claims that the AIRC has little or no expertise 
that would enable it to take account of the economic effects of minimum wage increases; Des 
Moore accuses the AIRC of a failure over 100 years to deliver wage justice (‘Why Labour 
Market Players Should Have Freedom of Contract’ (2005) 38 (2) Australian Economic Review 
192, ‘a serious problem exists when many of those who sit on cases involving workplace 
relations are wont to interpret regulatory laws according to their own views of what constitutes 
social justice and with little regard to the economic implications, let alone the intent of the 
legislation (194), and suggests that Australia’s minimum wage needs to fall (196); cf Chris 
Briggs and John Buchanan ‘Work, Commerce and the Law: A New Australian Model’ (2005) 
38 (2) Australian Economic Review 182,188 
101 Tulip ‘Do minimum wages raise the NAIRU?’, Finance and Economics Discussion Series 
2000-38, Federal Reserve Board, Washington DC; Matthew Ryan ‘Workplace Relations 
Reform, Prosperity and Fairness’ (2005) 38 (2) Australian Economic Review 201,209.  Borland 
and Woodbridge also found a statistically significant negative reaction between minimum wage 
levels and employment of the low-skilled:  Jeff Borland and Graeme Woodbridge ‘Wage 
Regulation, Low-Wage Workers and Employment’ in Sue Richardson ed Reshaping the Labour 
Market: Regulation, Efficiency and Equality in Australia (1999) p113.  They found that the 
differential between Australia’s minimum wage and that of the United States reduced 
employment of low-wage workers  by 12% (p114). 
102 Moore claims that more than half of low wage earners are in the top half of household 
incomes (presumably their spouse is in a well paid position)(197) 
103 Mark Wooden ‘The Changing Labour Market and its Impact on Work and Employment 
Relations’, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, University of 
Melbourne 
number of hours during which it is possible to work.104  It has been well 
documented that Australia has seen a drastic reduction in the number of 
permanent full-time jobs, and a corresponding large increase in the number of 
part-time and casual jobs, in recent years.  For example, between 1971 and 
1999, the number of permanent full-time positions dropped from 76% to 54% of 
the workforce, while casual employees increased from 6% to 22%.105  Given the 
exclusion now of minimum and maximum weekly hours of work for part-time 




This paper concludes that the Commonwealth has the constitutional power to 
enact its changes to workplace relations which took effect on 1 January 2006.  
The corporations power, as well as the trade and commerce and territories 
power, are likely to support the law, given the High Court’s past interpretation 
of those heads.  The author would also suggest with respect that the economic 
outcomes sought to be achieved by the legislation are a relevant consideration in 
defining the constitutionality of the amendments, given the lack of direct 
constitutional power over the ‘economy’, something that most citizens would 
expect to be primarily a concern for a central government in a federation.  It is 
submitted that a central government in a federation has a legitimate concern 
with issues such as (a) productivity (b) Australia’s minimum wage level and 
how it compares with other countries (c) working hours (d) categories of 
employment; and (e) the circumstances in which an employer may legally 
                                                 
104 A trend to increased working hours is not new in Australia – from 1970 to 2000, the number 
of employees working a standard 40 hour week dropped from 51% of the workforce to 31%: 
Australian Bureau of Statistics The Labour Force Cat No 6203, balanced by a rise in the 
percentage of workers working more than 45 hours per week (23 to 28%) and in those working 
1-29 hours per week (10 to 25%): Mark Wooden The Transformation of the Australian 
Industrial Relations System (2000), Federation Press, Sydney and Mark Wooden and Andrew 
Hawke ‘Factors Associated with Casual Employment: Evidence from the AWIRS’ (1998) 9 
Economics and Labour Relations Review 82.  Considering data from all OECD countries, the 
ILO concluded Australia is now in the top echelon in terms of working hours:  Lee, S ‘Working 
Hour Gaps:  Trends and Issues’ in Messenger, J ed Working Time and Workers’ Preferences in 
Industrialised Countries: Finding the Balance’ (2004) London, Routledge, 29, and Iain 
Campbell Long Working Hours in Australia: Working-Time Regulation and Employer 
Pressures (2005) July Centre for Applied Social Research, Working Papers 2005-2 
 
105 Australian Bureau of Statistics The Labour Force 1971 (ABS Cat No 6204) and Weekly 
Earnings of Employees (Distribution) Australia, August 1999, ABS Cat No 6310, 6203).  John 
Burgess and William Mitchell also highlight the high growth in casual labour in Australia in 
The Australian Labour Market (2001) 43(2) Journal of Industrial Relations 124 (June) 
106 Is this a concern?  While some point to the resultant job insecurity for those employed on 
non-permanent arrangements (see eg Burgess, J and Campbell, I ‘The Nature and Dimensions of 
Precarious Employment in Australia’ (1998) 8 Labour and Industry 5, Campbell I and Brosnan, 
P ‘Labour Market Deregulation in Australia: The Slow Combustion Approach to Workplace 
Change’ (1999) 13 International Journal of Applied Economics 353 or lack of involvement in 
decision making:  Hall, R, Harley, B and Whitehouse, G ‘Contingent Work and Gender in 
Australia: Evidence from the 1995 Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey’ (1998) 9 
Economic and Labour Relations Review 55, there is evidence from the 1995 Australian 
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS) that casual and part-time employees don’t feel 
any more insecure than full time employment; nor is there a higher degree of turnover among 
non-permanent employees compared with permanent.  In fact, casual employees had higher 
overall satisfaction levels than permanent employees. 
dismiss an employee.  The working world has changed radically in Australia in 
recent years.  The Commonwealth Government is submitted to be entitled to 
reform the legal regulation of work in Australia to take account of past changes, 
and to prepare Australia for the challenges that lie ahead. 
